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"FORGIVE ME VICTIM FOR I HAVE SINNED":
WHY REPENTANCE AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM DO
NOT MIX-A LESSON
FROM JEWISH LAW
Cheryl G. Bader*
INTRODUCTION
The appropriate intersection of religious values and an attor-
ney's functions as a legal advocate and a counselor has been hotly
debated. At a recent conference on this topic at Fordham Law
School, I had the pleasure of learning about the extraordinary
work of the Georgia Justice Project ("GJP"), 1 a criminal defense
organization with a practice philosophy grounded in Christian the-
ology. 2 The GJP maintains a central mission of redirecting the
lives of its clients to achieve moral religious redemption.' A cen-
tral feature of this practice is the GJP's encouragement of client
confession, in the form of letters written to victims and their family
members, whereby clients seek forgiveness prior to the adjudica-
tion of their criminal cases.4
Unfortunately, the criminal justice system is not an ideal setting
to pursue religious redemption,5 as our secular courts are not de-
signed to advance a criminal defendant's potential goal of seeking
* Assoc. Clinical Prof. of Law, Fordham Univ. School of Law. Many thanks to
Prof. Russell Pearce for his inspiration and editorial suggestions, and to Jonathan
Fass, Jacqueline Tepper, and Prof. Ian Weinstein for their helpful comments. I am
deeply indebted to my research assistants Sandra Valdivieso, an outstanding legal re-
searcher, and Chaim Zellinger, a true Talmudic scholar.
1. Georgia Justice Project ("GJP") is a non-profit organization that represents
indigent criminal defendants. See Georgia Justice Project, Who We Are, at http://
www.gjp.org /who we-are.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2003) [hereinafter GJP, Who We
Are].
2. See Douglas B. Ammar, Forgiveness and the Law: A Redemptive Opportunity,
27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1583, 1585 (2000) [hereinafter Ammar, Forgiveness and the
Law].
3. Id. at 1595.
4. See id. at 1584, 1597 (explaining that the GJP encourages clients to write let-
ters asking for forgiveness); Douglas B. Ammar & Tosha Downey, Transformative
Criminal Defense Practice: Truth, Love, and Individual Rights-The Innovative Ap-
proach of the Georgia Justice Project 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 49 [hereinafter Ammar,
Truth, Love, and Individual Rights] (explaining that the GJP encourages apology).
5. See Ammar, Forgiveness and the Law, supra note 2, at 1596.
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absolution of sin.6 In fact, under the American criminal justice sys-
tem, a criminal defendant who asks a victim for forgiveness creates
legally admissible evidence of his own guilt.7 This evidence is ad-
missible whether the defendant's motive is to pursue religious re-
pentance and redemption or otherwise.8 This provides a clear
disincentive to seeking religious absolution through confession
while a criminal case is pending.9
Taking another approach that avoids mingling of criminal prose-
cutions and repentant confessions, ancient Jewish law places a
complete prohibition on the use of confession in the adjudication
of a criminal case. 10 This prohibition bars both admissions of guilt
in the form commonly known as a guilty plea and admissions of
guilt in an extra-tribunal context.11 The lack of any evidentiary
value of confessions under Jewish Law stands in stark contrast to
the high premium placed on an accused's confession under the
American criminal justice system. 2
This essay will critique the GJP's encouragement of confessions
in the context of the secular American justice system via compari-
son with the treatment of confessions under ancient Jewish law. 3
6. See id. at 1590.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 1596.
10. Steven H. Resnicoff, Criminal Confessions in Jewish Law, Project Genesis,
Inc., at http://www.torah.org/features/secondlook/criminal.html (last visited Nov. 9,
2003) [hereinafter Resnicoff, Criminal Confessions in Jewish Law] ("[W]hile admis-
sions of civil liability raise different issues, Jewish law not only forbids coerced crimi-
nal confessions but basically bans the use of any criminal confession."); Symposium,
The Adversarial vs. the Inquisitorial System: Reflections on the O.J. Simpson Trial,
ToURO JEWISH L. REP., Dec. 1995, (quoting Prof. Aaron Kirschenbaum explaining
that "in classical Jewish law a confession not only could not be coerced, but even a
voluntary confession would not be entertained"), available at http://
www.tourolaw.edu/Publications/jewishlaw/dec95/lrdec95 .ht ml#symposium.
11. See Resnicoff, Criminal Confessions in Jewish Law, supra note 10.
12. Anthony X. McDermott & H. Mitchell Caldwell, Did He or Didn't He?, 69 U.
CIN. L. REV. 863, 870-71 (2001) (stating the importance of confessions in the Ameri-
can criminal justice system).
13. Jewish law, called Halakhah in Hebrew, is compromised of the written law in
the Hebrew Bible, and the oral law, later partially transcribed in the Talmud. Tracey
R. Rich, Halakhah: Jewish Law, JUDAISM 101, at http://www.jewfaq.org/halakhah.htm
(last visited Nov. 25, 2002) (explaining that "Halakhah is made up of mitzvot from the
Torah as well as laws instituted by the rabbis and long-standing customs" and that
"[a]ll of these have the status of Jewish law and all are equally binding"). The oral
law was given in conjunction with the written law and was transmitted through the
generations in its entirety. See id. Between 100 C.E. and 500 C.E., due to the Roman
persecution and Jewish exile from Israel, transmission in this fashion was no longer
feasible. To avoid the loss of this knowledge, the Rabbis of the time put this oral law
into writing, creating the Talmud. See Talmud Bavli, Tractate Berachos, The Record-
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Specifically, this essay posits that the absolute prohibition on the
use of confessions in a legal system firmly rooted in religious values
recognizes the danger inherent in combining the act of speaking of
one's sins for religious penance with the use of such confessions in
the criminal adjudication process. 14 The Jewish legal system avoids
these inherent dangers by completely devaluing the accused's con-
fession. 15 The GJP, in contrast, merges the process of seeking ab-
solution with the criminal adjudication of the client's criminal case,
not only running the risk of exposing the client to greater criminal
liability, 16 but also risking devaluing the act of speaking ones sins to
achieve true spiritual repentance by compelling confession as a
condition to legal representation. 17
The GJP has devoted substantial resources and energy to provid-
ing clients with quality legal representation and a wide array of
social services and emotional and financial support.' 8 I applaud
the GJP for its holistic approach to lawyering and its commitment
to the laudable ideology of restorative justice. Nonetheless, I in-
tend to strike a note of caution to defense attorneys who utilize
their role as legal advocate and advisor to seek religious repen-
tance for their clients in the context of a secular criminal justice
system that does not subjugate evidentiary efficacy to religious
aspirations. 9
Part I of this Essay briefly reviews the unique approach to repre-
sentation provided by the GJP.20 Part II discusses the role of con-
ing of the Oral Law, JewishAmerica, at http:// www.jewishamerica.com/ja/timeline/
writoral.cfm (last visited Nov. 16, 2003); see also Tracey R. Rich, Torah, JUDAISM 101,
at http://www.jewfaq.org/halakhah.htm (last modified Nov. 25, 2002) (explaining that
the Talmud was written down between the second century C.E. and the fifth century
C.E.). The courts adjudicating Jewish Law are known as Beth Din. Chicago
Rabbinical Council, Beth Din: Rabbinic Court of Law, at http://www. crcweb.org/
Beth%20Din/Beth%20Dinl.htm (last modified Nov. 6, 2003).
14. This essay is meant to raise questions and encourage further discussion. It is a
preliminary exploration of a topic that merits further discussion.
15. See Laws of Witnesses ch. 35, § 135 (Rabbi J. L. Kadushin trans., Jewish Code
of Jurisprudence: Talmudical, Commercial and Criminal Law (1915)) (stating that in
order for a confession to be accepted, it must be confirmed by two witnesses); see also
Resnicoff, Criminal Confessions in Jewish Law, supra note 10 (explaining that the
possibility of "purposeful psychological or physical manipulation" also detracts from
the credibility of criminal confessions).
16. See infra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 31-52, 223 and accompanying text.
18. GJP, Who We Are, supra note 1 (stating that "GJP programs include[:] Qual-
ity Legal Representation[;] Individual Counseling[;] Job Training and Employment[;]
Addiction Counseling[; and] Educational Assistance").
19. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
20. Infra notes 26-60 and accompanying text.
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fession in the context of the American criminal justice system. 21
Part III contrasts the treatment of criminal confessions under tradi-
tional Jewish Law with their treatment under the American secular
system.22  Part IV concludes with the contention that efforts to
combine the process of repentance with the criminal adjudicative
process are problematic from both a legal and religious perspec-
tive.23 Jewish Law, by stripping any evidentiary value from the act
of confession apparently favors the process of repentance through
confession above the process of obtaining criminal convictions.24
The American criminal justice system makes no such
accommodation.25
I. THE GEORGIA JUSTICE PROJECT
The GJP is a private non-profit organization that represents indi-
gent criminal defendants. 26  It has adopted as a principal philoso-
phy a holistic approach to client representation,2 7 and it provides a
variety of services for the client, from continued education to job
placement.2 8 For example, in 1993 the GJP established New Hori-
zon Landscaping, 9 which "offers an opportunity of job training
and steady employment for [clients] served by Georgia Justice Pro-
21. Infra notes 61-146 and accompanying text.
22. Infra notes 147-201 and accompanying text.
23. Infra notes 202-35 and accompanying text.
24. See Resnicoff, Criminal Confessions in Jewish Law, supra note 10.
25. See infra notes 140-141 and accompanying text; Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A.
Leo, Symposium, Symposium on Coercion: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Coer-
cion, Exploitation, and the Law, 74 DENY. U.L. REV. 979, 983-84 (1997) (noting that
confessions are damaging evidence and lead to an expectation of conviction).
26. See Georgia Justice Project, Legal, at http://www.gjp.org/legal.html (last visited
Nov. 16, 2003) [hereinafter GJP, Legal]. GJP accepts clients only from within Fulton
or Delkaulb counties in Georgia. Id. The GJP accepts clients only at the beginning
stages of their criminal cases, usually right after they have been arrested. Id. The
GJP generally does not take any civil or federal cases. Id.
27. See GJP, Who We Are, supra note 1
GJP's mission is to ensure justice for the indigent criminally accused and
take a holistic approach to assist them in establishing crime-free lives as pro-
ductive citizens. GJP's goal is to have a positive impact on the lives of indi-
vidual clients and their families, which in turn positively affects the
community by decreasing crime and violence.
Id.
28. See id. Every GJP client works with a social worker, for example. Id. GJP
provides clients with counseling, job training, educational programs, and addiction
counseling. Id.
29. See Georgia Justice Project, New Horizon Landscaping, at http://www.gjp.org/
nhl.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2003) [hereinafter GJP, New Horizon Landscaping].
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ject. ' '30 This commitment to broad based client problem solving is
extremely admirable.
One unique and perhaps more troubling aspect of the nature of
the GJP's attorney-client relationship is that it is predicated on a
contract whereby the client agrees to make major "life changes. "31
Before the GJP agrees to represent an individual, extensive inter-
views are conducted.32 The GJP's social services staff assesses the
depth of the client's commitment to make "life changes" before
agreeing to represent the client.33 Once the GJP decides to take on
a client, the client must sign a contract whereby the GJP's contin-
ued representation is contingent on the client's continued attempts
to make the lifestyle changes that the GJP determines are in the
best interest of the client.34 The first four weeks of this representa-
tion constitute a "trial" period during which the GJP determines
whether to continue with its representation.3 5 If the client satisfac-
torily completes the trial period, a "probationary" period begins.36
The GJP continues to represent the client so long as he complies
with his part of the agreement.
The GJP has a religious foundation,38 and GJP lawyers engage
their clients in moral discussions and encourage religious repen-
tance. 39 According to the GJP's Executive Director Douglas Am-
mar, if the client is guilty, the GJP begins the client on a path to
atonement.40 The first step in this process involves the client's ac-
30. Id.
31. GJP, Legal, supra note 26 (explaining that the GJP requires that a defendant
commit to changing his life before he is taken on as a client).
32. Id.
33. Id.; Ammar, Truth, Love, and Individual Rights, supra note 4, at 3.
34. See GJP, Legal, supra note 26; Georgia Justice Project, Probationary Client
Contract, at http://www.gjp.org/generalContract.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2003)
[hereinafter GJP, Probationary Client Contract].
35. See Georgia Justice Project, Social, at http://www.gjp.org/social.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 25, 2003) ("[W]e find individuals who will take maximum advantage of the
opportunities available to them.").
36. See id.
37. See id.; GJP, Probationary Client Contract, supra note 34.
38. See Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson, Address to the Georgia
Justice Project, Atlanta, GA (May 17, 2002) (explaining that the GJP's philosophy is
based on religious principles and that by "[w]orking with religious advisors of all
faiths, the [GJP] shows its clients not only how to behave lawfully, but why they
should"), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2002/051702gajustice
project.htm.
39. Ammar, Truth, Love, and Individual Rights, supra note 4, at 7-8 (explaining
that repentance is encouraged).
40. See id. at 7.
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ceptance of responsibility for the crime he committed.41 Subse-
quent steps include apology to the victim, or to family members of
the victim;42 reparation in the form of compensation or restitution
to the victim;4 3 and penance or "self imposed hardship" meant to
repair the moral harm the client's action caused to the victim.44
The final step is reconciliation.45
The GJP's philosophy is based on the idea of restorative jus-
tice.46 Restorative justice "focus[es] on healing for victims, recon-
ciling victims and offenders, and reintegrating offenders into the
community. '47 Client's confessions, made in the form of apologies,
41. See id. (providing that repentance is the first step and defining repentance as
"remorsefully accepting responsibility for one's wrongful and harmful actions, repudi-
ating the character aspects that generated the aspects, and resolving to atone or make
amends for the [wrong and] harm done"); Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats:
Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (2003) [herein-
after Simons, Retribution for Rats].
42. See Ammar, Truth, Love, and Individual Rights, supra note 4, at 7; Ammar,
Forgiveness and the Law, supra note 2, at 1596.
43. See Ammar, Truth, Love, and Individual Rights, supra note 4, at 7.
44. Id. (defining penance as "'self-imposed hardship or suffering' that repairs the
moral harm the wrongdoer has inflicted on the victim"); Simons, Retribution for Rats,
supra note 41, at 36.
45. See Ammar, Truth, Love, and Individual Rights, supra note 4, at 7 (defining
reconciliation as "'the process by which the victim forgives the wrongdoer [and] com-
pletes the wrongdoers' reconciliation with the community' signaling that the debt has
been repaid") (internal citation omitted).
46. See Ammar, Forgiveness and the Law, supra note 2, at 1591. The movement
toward restorative justice began in the 1970s. Janelle Smith, Peacemaking Circles: The
"Original" Dispute Resolution of Aboriginal People Emerges as the "New" Alternative
Dispute Resolution Process, 24 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y 329, 336-37 (2003). This
approach is widely gaining acceptance. Gretchen Ulrich, Widening the Circle: Adapt-
ing Traditional Indian Dispute Resolution Methods to Implement Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Restorative Justice in Modern Communities, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL'Y 419, 435 (1999) (providing that restorative justice "is steadily building interest"
in the United States); Daniel W. Van Ness & Pat Nolan, Legislating for Restorative
Justice, 10 REGENT U. L. REV. 53, 53 (1998) ("Restorative justice is a growing interna-
tional movement within the fields of juvenile and criminal justice."). The restorative
justice model, like the GJP, has a religious foundation. Sadiq Reza, Religion and the
Public Defender, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1051, 1066-67 (1999) (providing that the
restorative justice model is an example of a model where "religious perspectives can
inform change in the criminal justice system itself, for instance by stimulating legisla-
tive reform to shift the emphasis from retribution and punishment to forgiveness and
healing").
47. Mijha Butcher, Using Mediation to Remedy Civil Rights Violations When the
Defendant is Not an Intentional Perpetrator: The Problems of Unconscious Disparate
Treatment and Unjustified Disparate Impacts, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 225,
252 (2003) ("Restorative justice seeks to give voice to the values of forgiveness, apol-
ogy, mercy, and reconciliation."); Elizabeth Latif, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apol-
ogies Tailored Toward Legal Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV. 289, 291 (2001) (providing
that restorative justice "makes the act of apology the centerpiece of victim-offender
mediations"); Reza, supra note 46, at 1066-67.
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are seen as the vehicle through which victims can begin "healing
the[ir] wounds" and clients can become "contributing members of
society."48
As a model of restorative justice, confession is a major underpin-
ning of the GJP's philosophy.4 9 The GJP requires, for example,
that a "guilty client" write letters of apology to victims or family
members of victims. 50 Their practice of encouraging, and in some
instances requiring clients to write letters to victims and victims'
families acknowledging their conduct and seeking forgiveness
prompted a flurry of criticism from several members of the audi-
ence attending the conference at Fordham. This controversial
practice is antithetical to a basic criminal defense premise that
while confession may be good for the soul, it is generally not good
for the case.51 Most criminal defense attorneys will caution clients
not to discuss a pending criminal case with anyone other than the
attorney and would certainly advise against writing letters to vic-
tims expressing remorse.52
Although the GJP boasts positive results in achieving non-incar-
ceration sentences for clients in comparison with the local public
defense office, 53 Executive Director Douglas Ammar acknowl-
edges that a causal link to the practice of pre-adjudication confes-
sion cannot be established.54 In fact, the GJP's non-incarceration
success rate is more likely attributable to the nature and amount of
resources the organization devotes to each individual client 55 and
48. Restorative Justice Online, Introduction, at http://www.restorativejustice.org/
rj3/intro default.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2004) ("Restorative justice is a systematic
response to wrongdoing that emphasizes healing the wounds of victims, offenders and
communities caused or revealed by the criminal behaviour."). Restorative justice
programs share four related steps. Id. The first step, Encounter, "[c]reate[s] opportu-
nities for victims, offenders and community members who want to do so to meet to
discuss the crime and its aftermath." Id. The second step, Amends, "[e]xpect[s] of-
fenders to take steps to repair the harm they have caused." Id. The third step, Rein-
tegration, "[s]eek[s] to restore victims and offenders as whole, contributing members
of society." Id. Finally, the fourth step, Inclusion, "[p]rovide[s] opportunities for par-
ties with a stake in a specific crime to participate in its resolution." Id.
49. See Ammar, Forgiveness and the Law, supra note 2, at 1594-96.
50. See, e.g., id. at 1584, 1597 (providing examples of letter writing on the part of
the client to seek forgiveness).
51. See id. at 1596 (explaining that criminal defense attorneys rarely utilize the
apology because the current configuration of evidence law and ethical standards gov-
erning the profession do not allow much room for it).
52. See id.
53. See Ammar, Truth, Love, and Individual Rights, supra note 4, at 13-14.
54. See id.
55. Each GJP lawyer represents approximately fifteen clients at a time. Margaret
Graham Tebo, Full-Service Assistance: Project Offers Free Representation to Clients
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the limited category of criminal accusations it defends clients
against.56 As Douglas Ammar points out, the judges before whom
the GJP appears are acutely aware of the broad support and social
services provided by social workers and other staff members of the
GJP,57 including placement of clients in educational programs and
job skills training.58 The GJP even provides jobs for some clients
within their organization.59 These unique features of GJP repre-
sentation most likely account for a court's willingness to provide
alternatives to incarceration for GJP clients.6 °
II. THE ROLE OF CONFESSION IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM
Extrajudicial confessions are generally admissible in the Ameri-
can criminal justice system, so long as certain basic requirements
are met.61 The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause requires, for
example, that a confession is admissible only if it is voluntarily
made.62 So long as the defendant's will is not overborne at the
Who Commit to Social Services Programs, 87 A.B.A. J. 26, 26 (Dec. 2001). At the
same time, the GJP puts a tremendous amount of time and resources into every cli-
ent. See Patrick Jonsson, Lawyers Defend Poor-If They Mend Their Ways, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 23, 2002, at 1 ("[GJP's] lawyers carefully research each case,
interview family members, write long letters to clients in jail, and even give them a job
mowing lawns after they come out."); see also Ga. Sup. Ct. Comm'n on Racial and
Ethnic Bias in the Court System, Let Justice Be Done: Equally, Fairly, and Impartially,
12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 687, 754-57 (1996) (explaining why most indigents are at a
disadvantage in attaining alternatives to incarceration because of their lack of suffi-
cient resources and social services); Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch, A The-
ory of Legal Strategy, 49 DUKE L.J. 1405, 1480 (2000) (providing that "spending more
resources .... can produce more favorable outcomes").
56. The GJP agrees to represent only about ten percent of those who apply. Am-
mar, Truth, Love, and Individual Rights, supra note 4, at 7. It generally limits its
representation to cases within Fulton or Dekalb counties that do not involve federal
or civil matters or charges of child abuse, domestic violence, drug trafficking, sex
abuse or vehicle violations. GJP, Legal, supra note 26.
57. See generally Tebo, supra note 55, at 26 (providing an example of the publicity
the GJP has received in the legal community for its innovative approach to selecting
and mentoring its clients and handling their criminal cases); see also GJP, Legal, supra
note 26.
58. See id.; Jonsson, supra note 55, at 1 (explaining that the GJP provides its cli-
ents with the ways and means of becoming useful and productive citizens); see also
GJP, New Horizon Landscaping, supra note 29 (providing an example of the job skills
and placement programs sponsored by the GJP).
59. GJP, New Horizon Landscaping, supra note 29.
60. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
62. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959). For a more in depth discus-
sion on confessional admissibility, see Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admis-
sibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 309, 373 (1998).
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time he makes his confession, his confession is considered volun-
tary.63 The Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination
also limits the admissibility of extrajudicial confessions. 64 A defen-
dant's confession is generally admissible only if the defendant
knowingly waives his rights before a custodial interrogation be-
gins.65 The well known Miranda decision and its progeny set forth
the requirements which law enforcement officials must abide in or-
der to ensure that an accused's confession does not violate the ac-
cused's right against self-incrimination.66
Despite various constitutional guarantees, criminal defendants
face immense pressure to confess throughout the judicial process.67
Systematic pressure can be so strong that even innocent defendants
confess to crimes they did not commit.68 This phenomenon is by
no means a new one.69 As far back as seventeenth century Salem,
for example, colonists falsely confessed that they were witches.7 °
After the murder of the famous Lindbergh baby in 1932, over 200
people falsely confessed to having committed the crime. 71 This
phenomenon continues today,72 as the pressure placed upon crimi-
nal defendants during police interrogations is so great that even
innocent defendants confess.73 The frequency and pervasiveness of
false confessions is reflected by the amount that has been written
63. See generally Spano, 360 U.S. at 320-21 (overturning a conviction based on a
finding that petitioner's involuntary confession was secured through pressures incom-
patible with the Fourteenth Amendment).
64. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
65. See id. at 475.
66. See id.
67. See, e.g., Corey J. Ayling, Corroborating Confessions: An Empirical Analysis
of Legal Safeguards Against False Confessions, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1121, 1177, 1179
(1984) (finding that there is enormous pressure from society for individuals to con-
fess); Penney, supra note 62, at 373 (1998) (noting that "the state has always placed
pressure on criminal suspects to confess in one form or another").
68. See James R. Agar, The Admissibility of False Confession Expert Testimony,
1999 ARMY LAW. 26, 26 (1999); Ayling, supra note 67, at 1179; Ofshe & Leo, supra
note 25, at 983 (noting that "confessions by the innocent still occur regularly").
69. See, e.g., Agar, supra note 68, at 26 (explaining that while "[f]alse confessions
may seem to be a recent phenomenon in criminal law, [] American history is replete
with examples of false confessions.").
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 25, at 983.
73. See Gail Johnson, False Confessions and Fundamental Fairness: The Need for
Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 6 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 719, 726 (1997)
(indicating that false confessions may be elicited during police interrogations even
where there is no physical coercion).
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on the subject.74 Commentators have developed various classifica-
tions of false confessions given during police interrogations 75 and
have proposed a host of potential solutions. 6
Systematic pressure on an accused individual to confess is exac-
erbated by the powerful impact of confessions on the criminal
prosecution." A criminal defendant who has confessed to the
crime is cloaked in a figurative presumption of guilt,78 such that
where police obtain a confession during interrogation, they con-
sider the crime solved and the defendant the guilty party.79 Prose-
cutors, recognizing the increased likelihood of obtaining a
conviction, are less inclined to make a favorable plea offer in cases
involving confessions.80 Conversely, defense attorneys are more
likely to take a grim view of the case and pressure the defendant to
plead guilty as the only hope of reducing the sentence.8 '
74. See, e.g., id. at 721-42 (describing how false confessions are elicited and the
problems associated with this practice); Penney, supra note 62, at 322-79 (explaining
the history of confessions and the effect of the 1966 Miranda decision); George C.
Thomas, The End of the Road for Miranda v. Arizona?: On the History and Future of
Rules of Police Interrogation, 37 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000) (noting various schol-
ars who have written about false confessions, including Paul Cassell and William
Stuntz).
75. See Johnson, supra note 73, at 726. "[V]oluntary false confessions" refer to
those instances where innocent persons approach the police on their own and falsely
confess to the crime. Id. "[C]oerced-compliant false confessions" occur where the
individual confesses for what he perceives to be an immediate gain, i.e., ending the
interrogation. Id. at 727. "[C]oerced-internalized false confessions" occur where the
individual confesses because the police convince him that he committed the offense
even though he did not. Id.; see also Maj. Joshua E. Katsenberg, A Three-Dimen-
sional Model for the Use of Expert Psychiatric and Psychological Evidence in False
Confession Defenses Before the Trier of Fact, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 783, 805-10
(2003) (discussing voluntary, coerced-compliant, and coerced-internalized false con-
fessions); Welsh H. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against
Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 109, 109 n.28 (1997).
76. See H. Patrick Furman, Wrongful Convictions and the Accuracy of the Crimi-
nal Justice System, 32 CoLo. L. REV. 11, 20 (2003) (suggesting that there is a need for
better training and taped interrogations); Johnson, supra note 73, at 735-41 (sug-
gesting that police interrogations be electronically recorded); Katsenberg, supra note
75, at 810 (suggesting videotaping interrogations, allowing expert testimony on false
confessions and placing a complete bar on the use of confessions obtained in a coer-
cive manner).
77. See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 25, at 983-84 (noting that confessions are argua-
bly the most damaging evidence the government can present at trial).
78. See id. at 984.
79. See id.
80. See id. (noting that after obtaining a confession, prosecutors become more ea-
ger to go to trial, as they have heightened expectations of attaining a conviction).
81. See id.
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Confessions are especially damning at trial.82 Jurors are likely to
treat the confession as determinative of a defendant's guilt,8 3 such
that confessions introduced at trial will make the defendant's con-
viction and subsequent incarceration much more likely.84 It is ex-
tremely difficult for defense attorneys to convince jurors that a
confession was given falsely.85
Pressure to confess from a client's attorney would exacerbate the
systematic pressure that already exists. 86 An attorney's influence
on a client can be particularly weighty due to the unequal nature of
attorney-client relationships.87 In representing indigent defend-
ants, the lawyer often wields a considerable amount of power over
her client.8 8 In fact, many commentators caution lawyers against
even discussing their moral views with the client for fear that they
will overbear the client's autonomy on moral questions.89
82. See id. at 983-84 ("A confession-whether true or false-is arguably the most
damaging evidence the government can present in a trial.").83. See id.; White, supra note 75, at 139 ("Empirical evidence suggests that a de-
fendant's confession will likely have an even more powerful impact on the jury than
eyewitness testimony."); Mitchell P. Schwartz, Comment, Compensating Victims of
Police-Fabricated Confessions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (2003) ("Studies have
demonstrated that jurors consider confessions to be the most persuasive evidence of a
defendant's guilt.").
84. See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 25, at 984.
85. See id.; see also Johnson, supra note 73, at 720 (providing that disagreements as
to what occurred during a police interrogation become a "swearing contest" between
the criminal defendant and law enforcement and explaining that a defense attorney
faces a "Catch 22" at trial when trying to convince a jury that her client confessed
falsely, because she must convince the jury that her client's version of the story is
more reliable than the police version while convincing the jury that her client is "un-
reliable" enough to have signed a false confession); White, supra note 75, at 139
("[J]uries will often refuse to believe that anyone would confess to a crime that they
had not committed.").
86. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
87. See Howard Lesnick, Symposium, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's
Work: An Interfaith Conference: General Responses to the Conference: The Religious
Lawyer in a Pluralist Society, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1469, 1493 (1998) (describing the
unequal nature of the attorney-client relationship); see also Robert F. Cochran, Jr. et
al., Client Counseling and Moral Responsibility, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 591, 594, 600 (2003)
[hereinafter Cochran et al., Client Counseling].
88. See Melanie D. Acevedo, Note, Client Choices, Community Values: Why Faith-
Based Legal Services Providers are Good for Poverty Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
1491, 1517 (2002) (providing that in the poverty law setting "the lawyer-who is edu-
cated, middle-class and typically white-interacts with a client who is poor, probably
uneducated and often a person of color" (citing Paul E. Lee & Mary M. Lee, Reflec-
tions From the Bottom of the Well: Racial Bias in the Provision of Legal Services to the
Poor, 1993 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 310, 312 (1993))).
89. See, e.g., Cochran et al., Client Counseling, supra note 87, at 596 (explaining
how advocates of client-centered lawyering believe that lawyers should be neutral and
non-judgmental and that clients should have full autonomy to make moral decisions);
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The traditional conception of the lawyer-client relationship was
based on the notion of the lawyer as a professional. 90 Clients were
presumed ignorant of the law, and lawyers, as "members of an
elite," were thought to be in the best position to advise their clients
on the right course of action.91 Short of identifying his problem,
the client's role in the relationship was extremely limited.92
The client-centered counseling approach was born in response to
criticism of traditional attorney-client relationships that subjugated
the role of the client.93 Client-centered advocates criticized the
traditional conception because it exacerbated the inequalities in-
herent in the lawyer-client relationship, particularly in the poverty
law setting.94 Client-centered lawyers advocate a relationship char-
acterized by client autonomy. The lawyer remains neutral while
working with the client to understand the client's own values and
goals and present possible options to pursue. 96 The client, how-
ever, makes all the decisions that are germane to the outcome of
the case.97
A third approach, closer in philosophy to the GJP's, was estab-
lished in response to client-centered counseling.98 Under this ap-
Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics in Counseling, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 602, 608 (2003) (finding
that client-centered counseling often restricts lawyers to a role that ill-serves the cli-
ent's interests); Acevedo, supra note 88, at 1518 (finding that clients can easily be
manipulated by their lawyers and fall prey to coercion).
90. See Joseph Allegretti, Religious Values and Legal Dilemmas in Bioethics: The
Role of a Lawyer's Morals and Religion When Counseling Clients in Bioethics, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 9, 12-13 (2002) (describing the authoritarian model of lawyer-
client relationships); Alex J. Hurder, Negotiating the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A
Search for Equality and Collaboration, 44 BUFFALO L. REV. 71, 77 (1996) ("The cli-
ent-centered approach developed in reaction to the dominance of the lawyer in tradi-
tional models of lawyering.").
91. Allegretti, supra note 90, at 13 (quoting Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 15-24 (1975)).
92. See Hurder, supra note 90, at 77 (describing the traditional approach, but argu-
ing for the collaborative approach).
93. See id.; Allegretti, supra note 90, at 15.
94. See Reza, supra note 46, at 1059-61 (explaining that the lawyer/client relation-
ship is especially unequal when dealing with indigent criminal defendants "whose ed-
ucation and outlook typically differ radically from those of the attorney").
95. See Allegretti, supra note 90, at 15; Cochran et al., Client Counseling, supra
note 87, at 601 ("The client-centered counselor seeks to protect the client's auton-
omy."); Rhode, supra note 89, at 604.
96. See Allegretti, supra note 90, at 15.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 16-17 (describing the collaborative approach, which allows lawyers to
engage clients in moral dialogue, while avoiding the problems of the authoritarian
client-centered models). This approach, coined the "collaborative approach to lawy-
ering by Robert Cochran, Jr., is one of many approaches to lawyering proposed by
various scholars as representing a middle ground between client-centered lawyering
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proach, the lawyer may introduce and discuss with the client moral
issues that she believes to be relevant to the client's case, 99 while
remaining cognizant not to impose her beliefs on the client until he
has reached his final decision as to what course of action to take.100
Once the client has made his decision, however, the lawyer may
impose her beliefs on the client if she considers his final decision to
be "morally wrong." 10 1  Proponents of the "collaborative" ap-
proach criticize the client-centered approach on the ground that
client-centered lawyers assume that their clients value freedom
from incarceration above all else.1 2
The focus of client-centered lawyering, however, is on client au-
tonomy.10 3 Client-centered lawyers caution against making as-
sumptions about their clients.' 04 Client-centered lawyering calls
upon attorneys to engage their clients in dialogue in order to deter-
mine the client's values and form the representation in accordance
with the client's values rather than the values of the attorney.105
"Collaborative" critics of the client-centered approach contend
that lawyers do their clients a disservice by not discussing moral
and traditional conceptions of the lawyer's role. For a more in depth discussion of
other approaches to lawyering, see Abbe Smith, Promoting Justice Through Interdisci-
plinary Teaching, Practice, and Scholarship: The Difference in Criminal Defense and
the Difference it Makes, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 83, 94-107 (2003) [hereinafter
Smith, The Difference].
99. See, e.g., Allegretti, supra note 90, at 17 (noting that the collaborative model
"encourages the client to consider.., the interests of others who might be affected by
her decisions").
100. See id. The GJP appears to express its moral beliefs at the outset of its rela-
tionship with potential clients. See Ammar, Truth, Love, and Individual Rights, supra
note 4, at 8 ("Convincing the offender to accept responsibility is a challenge, because
of the potentially far-reaching consequences, but we have found that the early estab-
lishment of a relationship of trust enables the client to believe that we are working for
his best interest and for the interest of the community.")
101. Rhode, supra note 89, at 610.
102. See Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive Criminal-Law Values and
Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendre Pleas, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1361, 1404-05 (2003) (criticizing the client-centered counseling approach be-
cause "[ilt ignores the constructive role that defense lawyers can play in educating and
transforming clients' misperceptions and short-term desires" and because it discour-
ages confession); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselor-at-
Law: Lessons from Dostoyevsky, 35 Hous. L. REV. 327, 331 (1998) [hereinafter
Cochran, Lessons from Dostoyevsky].
103. Allegretti, supra note 90, at 15; Cochran et al., Client Counseling, supra note
87, at 601; Rhode, supra note 89, at 604.
104. See Bibas, supra note 102, at 1404-05; Cochran, Lessons from Dostoyevsky,
supra note 102, at 331.
105. See Allegretti, supra note 90, at 15.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
issues with them.10 6 For example, Robert Cochran, Jr., in his arti-
cle Crime, Confession, and the Counselor-at-Law: Lessons from
Dostoyevsky, °7 argues that the collaborative approach to lawyer-
ing is most beneficial to the client because it allows the lawyer to
discuss moral issues with the client as a friend would. 10 8 As a re-
sult, the lawyer is able to ascertain whether the client values con-
fession and "clear conscience" over and above his freedom from
conviction. 10 9 According to Cochran, by discussing moral issues
with the client, the collaborative lawyer is able to make the most
difference in her client's life." 0
Many commentators argue, however, that it is not the lawyer's
place to introduce her own morality into discussions with the cli-
ent. 11 Ethics scholar Monroe Freedman, for example, provides
that once the lawyer-client relationship has been established, the
lawyer should refrain from discussing any moral issues with the
client.112
Concerns regarding the infusion of morality in client counseling
are especially significant in the poverty law setting." 3 Commenta-
tors have noted the inherent differences between attorney and cli-
ent in this context." 4 For example, it is unlikely that poverty
lawyers and their clients will have shared common life experiences
or socio-economic backgrounds." 5 Thus, the client's values may
not comport with the lawyer's, making the lawyer's own moral ad-
vice somewhat irrelevant.1 1 6 A collaborative lawyer runs the risk
of imposing her beliefs on the client, despite efforts to the con-
106. See Cochran, Lessons from Dostoyevsky, supra note 102, at 342; cf. Bibas,
supra note 102, at 1404-05.
107. See Cochran, Lessons from Dostoyevsky, supra note 102, at 342.
108. See id. at 379-80.
109. See id. at 384.
110. See Bibas, supra note 102, at 1404-05.
111. See Monroe H. Freedman, Brendan F Brown Lecture Commentary: Legal Eth-
ics and the Suffering Client, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 331, 332 (1987); Rhode, supra note
89, at 608; Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Be-
half of People Who do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 925, 934-35 (2000) [here-
inafter Smith, Defending Defending]; Acevedo, supra note 88, at 1518.
112. Freedman does provide that a lawyer's morality can play a role, though, to the
extent that a lawyer is able to decide whether to represent a client. Freedman, supra
note 111, at 332 (providing that a lawyer's own morality may properly influence her
decision before she agrees to represent a client, but arguing that once a lawyer agrees
to undertake the representation, she should do so zealously).
113. See infra notes 114-128 and accompanying text.
114. See Allegretti, supra note 90, at 20; Reza, supra note 46, at 1059-60.
115. See Reza, supra note 46, at 1059-60.
116. Id.
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trary.117 The "collaborative" approach also assumes that the law-
yer will have the requisite time to build a sufficiently in-depth
relationship with the client to offer such moral counsel.118
Courts have also registered their criticism of lawyers that impose
their religious beliefs on the client.119 The Utah case of State v.
Taylor 2° provides an example. 21 In that case, defendant Taylor
was charged with various counts, including criminal homicide.1 22
After discussing the case with his lawyer, Elliot Levine, Taylor pled
guilty.12 3 At the penalty phase, Levine stated in his closing
argument:
I talk to my client, I need to know whether or not they commit-
ted that crime .... And if that's the case then I feel it's my
obligation to get that person to take the first step, and that is to
come forth, admit their wrong doing, then to get them through
the system in a sense that the appropriate punishment is im-
117. See Allegretti, supra note 90, at 20 ("Some scholars have worried that the col-
laborative and friendship models might be a cloak for subtle manipulation and domi-
nation by the lawyer."); Cochran et al., Client Counseling supra note 87, at 600; Bruce
A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 19, 46-47 (1997); Reza, supra note 46, at 1060.
118. See Cochran et al., Client Counseling, supra note 87, at 600 ("Moral counsel
also requires time, a scarce commodity in the hourly billing-driven practice of the
corporate lawyer or the heavy case-load practice of the legal aid lawyer.").
119. Infra notes 120-28 and accompanying text. See also Stropnicky v. Nathanson,
19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39 (MCAD Feb. 25, 1997), affd, No. 91-BPA-0061 slip
op. (Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination July 26, 1999) (affirmed on review to the
full commission); Teresa Stanton Collett, Symposium: The Relevance of Religion To a
Lawyer's Work: An Interfaith Conference: General Responses to the Conference: Speak
No Evil, Seek No Evil, Do No Evil: Client Selection and Cooperation With Evil, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 1339, 1359 n.80 (1998) (explaining that "[t]he Tennessee Bar Asso-
ciation has taken the position that a pro-life Catholic lawyer has a professional obliga-
tion to accept court appointed representation of a minor seeking an abortion");
Jennifer Tetenbaum Miller, Note, Free Exercise v. Legal Ethics: Can a Religious Law-
yer Discriminate in Choosing Clients?, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 161, 163-166 (1999)
(discussing Tennessee abortion decision, and a Massachusetts decision holding that a
lawyer's moral decision to represent only women in divorce cases constituted discrim-
ination) (citing Tenn. Bd. of Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. No. 96-F-140
(1996)).
120. 947 P.2d 681 (Utah 1997).
121. For a more detailed discussion of the case, see Cochran, Lessons from Dosto-
yevsky, supra note 102, at 329-31.
122. See Taylor, 947 P.2d at 684.
123. See id. at 683. The trial court did not find that Levine encouraged Taylor to
plead guilty. Id. at 684. Rather, the trial court found, and the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed, that Levine "did not pressure Taylor to plead guilty," and that "Taylor pled
voluntarily because he did not want to put his family and the victims through a trial
and he did not want to testify." Id.
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posed and they live with that punishment. That's exactly what
I've done in Mr. Taylor's case.124
The Utah Supreme Court found that Levine's arguments were
merely strategic. 125 The Court, however, provided that, "[i]t is not
the role of defense counsel to persuade a defendant to plead guilty
because counsel concludes that the defendant committed a
crime.''126 The Court suggested that the lawyer should remain neu-
tral.127 It commented:
[c]ertainly attorneys are bound to have private feelings about
the clients they represent and their guilt or innocence, but it is
their professional responsibility to set aside private feelings and
judgments and vigorously argue the law and the facts in a light
as favorable to the defendant as the facts and the law permit.
121
Client-centered counseling is also criticized on the ground that
client-centered lawyers fail to take into account how the client's
decision may affect the community as a whole. 129 Restorative jus-
tice focuses on community but in doing so runs the risk of putting
the community's interests against the interests of the client's. 3 '
This focus on community can detrimentally affect the defense law-
yer's zealous representation of her client.' Zealous representa-
tion is especially important in the poverty law context.132 An
indigent defendant cannot "shop around" for counsel that will zeal-
124. State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357, 362 (Utah 1994) (Stewart, J. & Durham, J.,
concurring) (quoting Levine's closing argument in Taylor).
125. See Taylor, 947 P.2d at 686.
126. Holland, 876 P.2d at 362 (emphasis removed).
127. See id. ("[Ilt is [the] professional responsibility [of a defense attorney] to set
aside private feelings and judgments and vigorously argue the law and the facts in a
light favorable to the defendant as the law and facts permit.").
128. See id.
129. See Cochran, Lessons from Dostoyevsky, supra note 102, at 340.
130. Ammar, Truth, Love, and Individual Rights, supra note 4, at 7.
131. See Smith, Defending Defending, supra note 111, at 951-52
It is difficult, if not impossible, to zealously represent the criminally accused
and simultaneously tend to the feelings of others .... It is simply wrong to
place an additional burden on criminal defense lawyers to make the world a
better place as they labor to represent individuals facing loss of liberty or
life.
Id.; see also Smith, The Difference, supra note 98, at 92 ("My chief concern about
indigent criminal defense is that some criminal lawyers do not engage in zealous advo-
cacy and too often betray client confidences, sometimes for so-called 'moral'
reasons.").
132. As it is, "in most criminal cases the balance is weighted heavily on the govern-
ment's side." Smith, The Difference, supra note 98, at 110.
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ously advocate on his behalf.133 He is limited to the attorney that is
appointed to him and to that attorney's concept of zealousness. 134
Indigent defendants often enter the lawyer-client relationship dis-
trustful of whether the lawyer is "really working for them. ' 135 As
the client sees that the lawyer places his interests above all else, he
becomes more likely to trust his lawyer.1 36 Furthermore, a defense
lawyer's zealous representation helps to safeguard against the pos-
sibility that an innocent defendant is convicted of a crime he did
not commit.1 37
The GJP's restorative justice philosophy is evidenced in its focus
on client confession. 1 3  Restorative justice attempts to restore the
victim by presenting an opportunity for forgiveness and to restore
the client by allowing him the opportunity to achieve atonement. 139
Critics of the restorative justice approach argue that its emphasis
on confession makes it incompatible with the American criminal
justice system. 4 ° Confessing can be dangerous for the client from
a legal perspective because confessions are arguably the most pow-
erful evidence to establish the client's guilt.14 1
Commentators have raised the possibility of clients using other
types of apologies, or "partial apologies," where the client's apol-
133. See Smith, Defending Defending, supra note 111, at 935 ("Poor people accused
of crime do not have the luxury to pick and choose among lawyers.").
134. See id.
135. Smith, The Difference, supra note 98, at 119 ("Clients who are unable to
choose because they cannot pay for their own lawyer are more likely to ... believe
that their lawyer is not really working for them").
136. See id.
137. Monroe Freedman provides, for example, that one "systemic reason for the
zealous representation that characterizes the adversary system ... is not only to re-
spect the humanity of the guilty defendant and to protect the innocent from the possi-
bility of an unjust conviction." Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized
Adversary System, 1 CHAP. L. REV. 57, 61 (1998).
138. See supra notes 1-4, 40-48 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
140. See Butcher, supra note 47, at 252; Latif, supra note 47, at 301-04 (discussing
restorative justice and providing that "[c]urrently, the Federal Rules of Evidence and
most state codes of evidence treat an apology that admits fault as an admission of
guilt"). Another critique is that the goal of restoring the victim can never really be
achieved without punishment, and that the restorative justice movement's focus on
client forgiveness is therefore misplaced in the American criminal justice system's
retributive system. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, The Theory and Jurisprudence of
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 303, 305 (2003) ("[T]he victim . .. cannot
really be restored without punishment.").
141. See Jonathan Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009,
1013 (1999) (discussing the use of apology in the civil context and providing that one
of the "risks associated with apology ... is the fear that an apology can be used
against one's client in court as an admission of fault"); Latif, supra note 47, at 309-12.
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ogy falls just short of admitting guilt, and "safe apologies," where
the client waits until the end of his criminal case to apologize. 14 2
Restorative justice purists have criticized both of these approaches
as detracting from the full effect that the confession is supposed to
have on the victim. 143
Whether a lawyer considers her proper role to be that of a "neu-
tral partisan," there to help the client reach his own decisions, or
that of a "collaborator," there to challenge the client to take what
the lawyer considers to be morally correct action, may have a
greater affect on the outcome of the client's case than the lawyer
realizes.1 44 If a client writes a letter to a victim, confessing his sin
and asking for forgiveness, as the GJP's clients do, the client runs
the risk of his confession being admitted in his criminal case.145
The rules of evidence and criminal procedure in the American judi-
cial system are not accommodating to restorative justice principles
or a client's interest in religious redemption. 46
III. THE ROLE OF CONFESSION IN TRADITIONAL JEWISH LAW
In contrast to American law, under Jewish law, confessions have
no evidentiary value in criminal adjudications. 147 In a traditional
Rabbinical court, criminal conviction could only be obtained
through the testimony of two witnesses. 148 The two witness re-
quirement is clearly stated in the Bible: "One witness will not rise
up against a man for any iniquity or sin that he sinneth; at the word
of two witnesses, or at the word of three witnesses, shall a matter
be established."' 49 It is from this Biblical verse that the Talmud
extrapolates that a confession cannot lead to a conviction. 150 Al-
142. Cohen, supra note 141, at 1030-67; Latif, supra note 47, at 305-12 (discussing
partial and safe apologies).
143. See Cohen, supra note 141, at 1067 ("Some may feel that 'safe' apologies are
duplicitous: If you are really sorry, should you not be willing to pay for what you have
done?"); Latif, supra note 47, at 309-12.
144. See supra notes 86-89, 111-17 and accompanying text.
145. E.g., O'Neal v. State, 228 Ga. App. 162, 163 (Ct. App. 1997) (affirming the
trial court's finding that a letter of apology written by the defendant is admissible).
146. See supra notes 140-41, 145 and accompanying test.
147. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
148. See Talmud Bavli, Tractate Sanhedrin 9b (Rabbi Asher Dicker & Rabbi Abba
Tzvi Naiman trans., Rabbi Hersh Goldwurn et al. eds., 1993). The Talmud sets forth
the stringent requirements for who may qualify as a witness. See Laws of Witnesses,
supra note 15, at ch. 20-39, §§ 64-161b (providing an in-depth discussion of the rules
of witness qualification).
149. Deuteronomy 19:15 (The Pentateuch & Haftorahs: Hebrew Text, English
Translation and Commentary (Dr. J. H. Hertz ed., Soncino Press 2d ed. 1960) (1938)).
150. See Talmud Bavli, Tractate Sanhedrin 9b.
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though the passage does not specifically prohibit the use of confes-
sions and could be interpreted to allow the accused to constitute
one of the witnesses, the Talmud makes clear that the evidentiary
requirement of two independent witnesses may not be satisfied
with the accused's confession.
151
The Talmudic prohibition against an accused acting as one of the
witnesses against himself is derived from an oral interpretation 152
of a Biblical passage prohibiting the testimony of the accused's rel-
atives. 53 The accused is deemed to be a relative to himself and
therefore is similarly disqualified from testifying.'54 Although the
prohibition on confessions is derived through a combination of
Biblical interpretations that to those unfamiliar with Talmudic
analysis may not appear to be self evident, it is widely accepted by
both ancient sages and contemporary Talmudic scholars as divinely
decreed.155
The invalidity of confessions is a broad doctrine and results in
the almost total rejection of the testimony of the accused.156 The
very act of pleading guilty, the ultimate form of confession, is
deemed a nullity.157 In addition, a person could not render himself
an "evil doer," even for purposes beyond criminal conviction on
the basis of his own confession.15 8 For example, in order for an
individual to qualify as a reliable witness in any court proceeding,
the individual must be of upstanding moral character.159 If the in-
dividual had a blemished character, he would not be permitted to
testify in the Rabbinical courts. 6 ° If one confesses, however, to
151. Id.
152. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (providing an explanation of oral
law).
153. See Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale Rosenberg, In the Beginning: The Tal-
mudic Rule Against Self-incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 955, 976 (1988); see also
Deuteronomy 24:16 (providing that a father shall not be put to death for his child).
Rashi claims that oral law expanded upon this prohibition in order to forbid the testi-
mony of any relatives.
154. Talmud Bavli, Tractate Sanhedrin 10a. Relatives' testimony is prohibited
whether positive or negative. Laws of Witnesses, supra note 15, at ch. 28-34, § 120.
155. For an in depth and insightful discussion of the origins of the Jewish law prohi-
bition on self-incrimination, see Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 975-77.
See also AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, SELF-INCRIMINATION IN JEWISH LAW passim
(1970).
156. See Resnicoff, Criminal Confessions in Jewish Law, supra note 10.
157. Id.; Talmud Bavli, Tractate Sanhedrin 9b.
158. Talmud Bavli, Tractate Sanhedrin 9b.
159. See id.
160. Laws of Witnesses, supra note 15, at ch. 32, § 138 (noting that if one has com-
mitted a wrong, he cannot be a witness); see also Maimonidies, Laws of Witnesses ch.
10-11. Ignoramuses and professional gamblers are not reliable to stand witness. Laws
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committing an immoral act, that confession has no implication on
the individual's ability to bear witness in any case, except of course
one in which his own guilt is being adjudicated. 6' Accordingly, the
witness cannot disqualify himself as a witness on the basis of his
own admission of immoral character. 162
The absolute prohibition on self-incrimination is accepted by
Talmudic scholars as a divine decree and therefore not subject to
the same form of scrutiny in which legal scholars engage when ex-
amining the efficacy of secular legal doctrine. 63 Nevertheless,
even those legal principles that are divinely decreed may be ex-
plored for their underlying rationale. Miamonides, the preeminent
Jewish law scholar and philosopher, 164 has offered the following ra-
tionale for the absolute evidentiary prohibition on confession. An
individual who has "lost his mind" or has a suicidal tendency might
confess falsely.165 Accordingly, a divinely decreed measure would
of Witnesses, supra note 15, at ch. 32, § 132. Ignoramuses are not believed because it
is assumed that if one is unfamiliar with the Jewish Law at some point he has violated
it. Id. at ch. 33, § 146. As to professional gamblers, although technically gambling is
not forbidden under Jewish Law, it has the "luster of thievery." Id. at ch. 32, § 132.
When a person places a bet, he does not expect to lose; therefore upon losing the bet,
he does not part with his money in an entirely voluntary fashion. Id. In contrast, if
someone confesses to actual thievery in court, he is still considered a reliable witness
on other matters, and his integrity is entirely uncompromised. Id. at ch. 32, § 128.
This is because he is not permitted to compromise his own integrity through his own
confession. Id.
161. Talmud Bavli, Tractate Sanhedrin 9b.
162. Laws of Witnesses, supra note 15, at ch. 32, §§ 135-38; Maimonidies, Laws of
Witnesses 12:2.
163. See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 974 n.72.
164. Maimonides codified Jewish Law and provided in all areas of Jewish Law. He
lived in Egypt around 1100 C.E. See MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY:
SOURCES, PRINCIPLES VOL. 3, at 1181-86 (Bernard Auerbach & Melvin J. Sykes
trans., 1994).
165. Laws of Witnesses, supra note 15, at ch. 32; Maimonidies, Laws of Witnesses
12:2 (explaining that one may not confess against himself because there is believed to
be a possibility that he has lost his mind or become suicidal or sadomasochistic, such
that he might admit guilt in order to receive punishment, even though he is not
guilty). After giving this reason, the Rambam ends the paragraph by explaining that
the main reasoning of this rule is that it is a ruling of the king (G-d). Id. The Ridbaz,
an early fifteenth commentator on Maimonides, notes that while the Rambam's rea-
soning would work for a case of capital punishment, for cases of corporal punishment
this is insufficient. Id. The Ridbaz therefore proposes an alternative reason. Id. That
a person is not believed to testify about things that pertain to his own body or self
because they do not belong to him, but rather to G-d. Id. It is for this reason that a
person is not permitted to commit suicide as well. Id. On the other hand, his prop-
erty is nominally his, so he is believed to testify about it. Id. In conclusion the Ridbaz
also says "with all this I also admit that this is a ruling of the king (G-d) and one
cannot question it." Id.
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prevent an accused being put to death t66 on the basis of a confused
mind and would prevent the use the court system as a vehicle for
suicide.1 67
As Yale and Irene Rosenberg argue, however, reliability of the
confession could not be the sole concern of the prohibition.168
Even confessions with conclusive corroborating evidence that do
not present any indication of falsification are strictly prohibited.
169
The Rosenbergs suggest that the strict application of this procedu-
ral bar to prosecution is less troubling in a society and culture that
subscribes to divine retribution. 7 ' Even though in the Rabbinical
court, many guilty individuals will go unpunished to protect a very
few, all who are guilty will be punished in the ultimate court in
which G-d presides.7 1
The Talmud's treatment of confessions as they apply in cases in-
volving fines can also be seen as consistent with a bar on such evi-
dence in the criminal context. 172 Generally, if one is adjudged to
be a thief, the Rabbinic Court will order her to pay the victim the
value of the stolen goods plus an additional punitive fine in the
same amount.1 73 For example, if A were found guilty of stealing $
100 from B, A would be assessed a fine totaling $ 200.171 If, how-
ever, A were to come to the Rabbinic Court and admit that she
stole the $ 100 from B before any witnesses were to testify, she
would be assessed only $ 100, without the additional $ 100 fine.175
This would be true even if witnesses were subsequently to testify
that A stole the money. 176
Accordingly, one can conclude that an individual's admission can
serve as competent evidence that she stole the money and that the
166. Capital punishment was permitted in Rabbinical courts. See Haim H. Cohn,
Capital Punishment, in THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 526 (Menachem Elon ed.,
1975). For a list of offenses meriting capital punishment and the verses from which
the law is derived, see Talmud Bavli, Tractate Sanhedrin ch. 7-9.
167. Laws of Witnesses, supra note 15, at ch. 32.
168. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 1034-35 n.286-93.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
173. Generally, a thief must repay the value of the stolen item in addition to a fine
equal to the value of the goods, which is also paid to the legitimate owner. Maimoni-
dies, Laws of Theft 1:4. This obligation is derived by Talmud, Bava Kama 64-65 from
Deuteronomy 22:3.
174. Maimonidies, Laws of Theft 1:4.
175. Id. at 1:5.
176. See id. at 3:8-9. For an in depth discussion, see Encyclopedia Talmudis, Modeh
Beknass.
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reprieve from penalty is a positive consequence of the confes-
sion.1 77 A more widely accepted view is that the confession has no
evidentiary value regarding the theft of the money, but that the
admission is nonetheless accepted as an acknowledgement of a civil
liability. 171 Commentators explain that when the Talmud lends
credence to confessions in monetary matters, it is not affording
them any evidentiary value that an obligation previously existed;
rather, it views the confession as the actual creation of a new obli-
gation.' 79 Therefore, although an individual is prohibited from ad-
mitting criminal liability, there is no such limitation on admitting
civil liability.'8 0 Indeed, in civil monetary matters, it is believed
that "the confession of the defendant has the veracity of a hundred
witnesses."181
This apparent dichotomy between criminal and civil matters has
been explained as follows. A person's being-both body and soul
("nefesh")-belong not to the individual, but to G-d. 82 Accord-
ingly, the individual is not free to take a course of action that might
177. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
178. There are two different types of monetary judgments. There is a judgment
where the court decides that A owes B a sum of money because he either borrowed
the money from B, or he damaged B for that amount of value. Then there is a mone-
tary judgment from A to B, which can be classified as a penalty. In the case of a thief,
the two coexist in the same judgment. If two witnesses testify that A stole $100 from
B, A will be obliged to pay $200 to B, or double the value, for his crime. The first
$100 is a monetary duty that A owes to B for the $100 he has deprived B of by
stealing from him. The second $100 is a penalty imposed by the Torah. Therefore, A
can oblige himself for the $100 that is a civil liability (because he has deprived B of
the money and must repay) but not for the $100 that is a criminal liability. For an in
depth discussion, see Encyclopedia Talmudica, Hodoas Ball Din.
179. Talmud Ketubot 72a (finding that a confession in monetary matters will have
legal implications, but that implications will be limited to monetary matters); Talmud
Makos 3a (same); Teshuvos Rashbah vol. 2, § 231. There is also a minority view that
explains that the court actually believes B in monetary matters because of his confes-
sion. See id.
180. Talmud Ketubot 72a; Talmud Makos 3a; Teshuvos Rashbah vol. 2, § 231.
181. Talmud Makos 3a.
182. Maimonidies, Laws of Witnesses 12:2 (providing this explanation in Ridvaz's
commentary); see also Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 153, at 1038 n.296. The
Ronsebergs provide that "the total exclusion of selfinculpatory statements serves as a
fence around the two-witness rule and other commandments relating to the sanctity
of human life, and as a constant reminder of God's omniscience and omnipotence."
Id. at 1038-39. The Rosenbergs provide that in "Anglo-American doctrine ... a per-
son may not consent to a criminal act against himself," and they analogize this rule to
the prohibition on the use of confessions in Jewish law. Id. at 1037. A confession in a
capital case, for example, would be equivalent to a defendant committing suicide. Id.
In other words, under Jewish law, "one is not permitted to offer his life or his body
through the vehicle of a confession in a criminal case." Id. at 1037-38; see also supra
note 165 and accompanying text.
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dispose of life or cause bodily damage.183 Confessing to a crime
could result in the imposition of the death penalty or other forms
of corporal punishment.'18 4  In fact, Jewish law scholar Aaron
Kirschenbaum has opined that even an individual's reputation is
not her own to be defamed or debased by her own words.1 85 On
the other hand, an individual's monetary wealth is property that
she can freely divest herself of.'86 The Talmud does not protect
against imprudent monetary decisions.187
As is true in the Christian tradition,'88 Judaism includes in its
concept of repentance that an individual seek forgiveness 189 from
any victims he has wronged. In seeking an individual's forgiveness,
the perpetrator must verbally acknowledge his sin to the victim. 190
Maimonadies, 191 in the Laws of Repentance, ruled that, among
the requirements for repentance, there is a necessity to "speak out"
sins one has committed and one's resolution not to commit such
sins in the future. 92 There appears to be some disagreement in the
Talmud as to whether one is required to speak one's sins out
loud, 93 and many commentators on Maimonadies are bewildered
183. Supra notes 165, 182 and accompanying text.
184. See generally Ammar, Forgiveness and the Law, supra note 2, at 1596 (explain-
ing that criminal defense attorneys are reluctant to encourage clients to apologize to
victims as the laws of evidence will generally allow such apologies to be admitted in
court as confessions to the detriment of their clients' criminal proceedings).
185. See KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 155, at 74 (citing R. Shymon shkop, Novellae
to Kethuboth 18:05).
186. See supra notes 172-181 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
188. See Theodor Meron, Crimes and Accountability in Shakespeare, 92 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 11 (1998) ("According to Christian doctrine, a sinner who dies without
receiving communion, without confession and absolution, without a chance to repent,
may be doomed to eternal damnation.").
189. Maimonidies, Laws of Repentance 2:9.
190. Id. (providing commentary describing appeasement as verbally asking for
forgiveness).
191. Maimonidies, also known as Rambam, was a preeminent codifier of Jewish law
and Jewish Philosopher. He lived in Spain, the Middle East, and North Africa around
1135-1204 C.E. and was credited with authoring the Misneh Torah. Tracey R. Rich,
Sages and Scholars, JUDAISM 101, at http://www.jewfaq.org/sages.htm#Rambam (last
modified Nov. 25, 2002).
192. This speaking out is called "Vidduy" in Hebrew. It is unclear if this is even
confessional in nature as implied by the definition of the word "confession" in En-
glish. Indeed, the connotation of the term seems to be closer in concept to prayer and
an explicit expression for one's own benefit acknowledging that one has done wrong.
See Vidduy Introduction (Mesorah Publ'g 1998).
193. Maimonidies, Laws of Repentance 2:2-3. (In Law 3, Miamonidies compares
speaking out one's sins without resolving one's heart to repent to immersing oneself
in a purifying body of water while holding the source of the impurity in one's hands.
The immersion will be of no avail until one casts away the source of the impurity.); see
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by the approach he took in reaching this ruling, 94 particularly be-
cause King David195 in Psalms says "[f]ortunate is the one ... who
does not publicize his sins."'1 96 Rabbi Joseph Caro' 97 explains that
Maimonidies is applying this principle primarily in two cases; 1)
where someone has sinned publicly and therefore the sin is already
public knowledge, such that his speaking out only serves to inform
people that he has repented; and 2) where someone has sinned
against a fellow man and therefore must ask him for forgiveness. 98
Maimonidies himself later explains the requirement this way:
It is a great thing to speak out in public and specify ones sins...
when is this said when one has sinned against his fellow man,
however if he has sinned to G-d he does not have to publicize
himself, rather he is brazen faced if he does reveal them, rather
he shall repent before G-d and specify his sins to G-d and con-
fess them to Him and then can make a general public confession
saying that he has sinned to G-d and it is better if he does not
reveal his sins as it is stated[,] Fortunate is one who does not
publicize his sins.199
Publicly trumpeting that one has flouted the laws of G-d may
have a negative impact on the community. Accordingly, it seems
that the purpose of speaking out one's sins is to help solidify 'the
individual's resolve for repentance.2°° It is, however, clear that the
also Rabbienu Jonah, Gates of Repentance 1:41 (Rabbienu Jonah, a contemporary of
the Rambam whose work is the premier source for the laws of repentance, also lists
this among the requirements for repentance; however, in his list it is the seventeenth
item, which indicates that it is a less crucial element than all the requirements that
proceed it in the list.).
194. This is a common occurrence in the study of Jewish Law, as Maimonidies, for
the sake of brevity, simply presented the actual rules without indicating his underlying
reasoning therefore, and commentators are constantly striving to understand the un-
derpinnings of the Maimonidies rulings. Furthermore, in this instance, Maimonidies'
rulings appear to be in conflict with the teachings of an earlier sage. See infra notes
195-196 and accompanying text.
195. King David, King of Israel, authored a majority of the Book of Psalms. Ac-
cording to Jewish tradition, the Messiah will ultimately come from the descendents of
David. A Glossary of Basic Jewish Terms and Concepts, JUDAISM 101, at http:/f
www.ou.org/about/judaism/di.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2003).
196. Psalms 45 (The Pentateuch & Haftorahs: Hebrew Text, English Translation
and Commentary (Dr. J. H. Hertz ed., Soncino Press 2d ed. 1960) (1938)).
197. Rabbi Joseph Caro was the author of the Shulchan Oruch, the most commonly
used codification of Jewish Law. He also authored a commentary on Miamonidies.
He was born in Toledo, Spain in 1488 and emigrated to Tzefas, Israel in 1536. He
died in 1575. OU Dep't of Jewish Education, Great Leaders of Our People-Rabbi
Joseph Caro, at http://www.ou.org/padres/bios/caro.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2003).
198. Kesef Mishneh (commenting on Maimonidies, Laws of Repentance 2:2).
199. Maimonidies, Laws of Repentance 2:2.
200. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
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mere act of confessing one's sins in court does nothing to further
the repentance of the confessor, and if anything, a public in court
confession may be considered brazen faced. 20 1
IV. EFFORTS TO COMBINE THE PROCESS OF REPENTANCE WITH
THE CRIMINAL ADJUDICATIVE PROCESS IS
PROBLEMATIC FROM BOTH A LEGAL AND
RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE
As Jewish law demonstrates, the process of criminal adjudication
should not be merged with the process of seeking repentance from
G-d.2 °2 The Talmud's absolute prohibition on any form of criminal
confession 20 3 demonstrates a theologically based acknowledgement
of the inherent danger in combining the two processes. 204 By bar-
ring from evidence even undisputedly voluntary, intelligent, cor-
roborated confessions, Jewish law opts completely to divorce from
the criminal justice system the act of speaking out one's sins.20 5
Jewish law reflects a divine judgment that the purity of the act of
seeking repentance is paramount to the need to convict and punish
perpetrators in "earthly" tribunals. 0 6 Perhaps, in this regard, the
principles of restorative justice are more compatible with Jewish
law than the American criminal justice system.
The GJP seeks to serve its clients in a dual capacity.20 7 At the
same time that it undertakes legal representation of a client in the
secular criminal court system, it embarks on a mission to obtain
religious absolution from sin for the client.20 8
The GJP introduces an element of theological counseling that is
foreign to most attorney-client relationships.20 9 Indeed, legal rep-
resentation by the GJP is conditioned on a client pursuing religious
repentance. 210 By merging the process of religious repentance with
the process of criminal adjudication, the GJP runs the risk of com-
promising the client's success in both processes. 21' As detailed ear-
201. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 150-67 and accompanying text.
203. Supra notes 10-11, 150-62 and accompanying text.
204. Supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
205. Supra notes 150-67 and accompanying text.
206. Supra notes 150-67 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 31-52 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 31-52 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 86-89, 111-28 and accompanying text (discussing ideological
and practical concerns regarding attorneys attempts to influence their clients moral
decisions and encourage confession).
210. See supra notes 31-52 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 5-9, 77-85 and accompanying text.
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lier in this Essay, evidence of an accused's confession is a powerful
prosecution tool that can severely constrain a defendant's trial
strategy and plea bargaining position.212
Although extrajudicial confession may sometimes be a successful
criminal defense strategy, 213 a defense attorney's decision to em-
ploy that strategy should not be influenced by the attorney's per-
sonal theology.214 This outside motivation on the part of the
attorney may cloud her judgment regarding the legal merit of the
strategy.215 It may prove hard for the lawyer to separate her role as
legal counselor from her newly adopted role as religious
counselor.216
Merging the process of repentance with the adjudication of crim-
inal cases is problematic on a number of levels. Placing evidentiary
value on "confessions" made for the purpose of pursuing religious
repentance potentially stifles such confessions, particularly to the
extent the confessions are in the context of seeking forgiveness
from victims with whom the defendant shares no evidentiary privi-
lege.217 Conversely, if expressing remorse and asking forgiveness
from victims carries a potential benefit in terms of a reduced sen-
tence by the court, this potential benefit would provide a substan-
tial incentive for an accused to feign remorse and go through the
motions of insincerely asking for forgiveness. 21 8 In addition, in a
system in which confessions have evidentiary value, it is axiomatic
that law enforcement entities will seek to extract confessions.219
Inevitably, the potential exists for coercion, abuse and false confes-
220Surne tote-sion. Surrendering to such external pressure is antithetical to ex
212. See id.
213. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 125-28, 144-46 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
217. To the extent that one who sins must seek forgiveness from a victim in order to
achieve repentance, such "confession" must be spoken explicitly and is not subject to
any evidentiary privilege, such as a clergy privilege. See O'Neal v. State, 228 Ga. App.
162, 163 (Ct. App. 1997) (affirming the trial court's finding that a letter of apology
written by the defendant is admissible as evidence of his guilt); Latif, supra note 47, at
301-04 (explaining that "the Federal Rules of Evidence and most state codes of evi-
dence treat an apology that admits fault as an admission of guilt"); see also Cohen,
supra note 141, at 1013 (noting the admissibility of apologies as evidence of fault in
the civil context).
218. See Latif, supra note 47, at 304.
219. See supra notes 67-85 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
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periencing genuine regret, which is fundamental to true
repentance.221
The act of seeking repentance is by nature extremely complex
and personal. As is true with most matters religious in nature, the
experience will vary for each individual and cannot be reduced to
an institutionalized formula. Although the process of repentance
in both the Jewish and Christian tradition involves the act of seek-
ing forgiveness from another individual, repentance must be moti-
vated by a genuine feeling of regret for having wronged G-d as well
as any victimized individuals.
The motivation to seek repentance must be pure, unencumbered
by external pressures or the incentive to minimize one's punish-
ment in the criminal justice system or to obtain free and highly
desirable legal representation.222 Clearly, a coerced confession
benefits neither the victim nor the client.223 It is not clear from the
GJP's literature the extent to which continued representation is ex-
plicitly contingent on the attorney's assessment that the client has
made adequate progress on the path to repentance. Any effort,
however, on the part of an attorney to influence the conduct of a
client can have a profound impact.224 The attorney may not even
be cognizant of the degree of influence she wields over the cli-
ent.225 Furthermore, an attorney may not be in the best position to
assess a client's motivation.226 Indeed, the process of questioning a
client's religious resolve may erect a barrier in the attorney-client
relationship. Moreover, nothing in the training an attorney re-
ceives or the nature of her work qualifies the attorney to assist an
individual in seeking religious repentance.
There is no natural link between the criminal adjudication pro-
cess and pursuit of religious repentance. Indeed, the requirement
of a public allocution of guilt for acceptance of a guilty plea is in-
consistent with the notion under Jewish law that proclaiming one's
221. See Latif, supra note 47, at 305.
222. But see supra notes 31-52 and accompanying text (describing the GJP's policy
of requiring clients to commit to making "life changes" and, often, to apologizing to
their victims, in order to obtain representation).
223. See Latif, supra note 47, at 305 ("[I]ntervention[s that lead to coerced confes-
sion] may make the apology meaningless to both parties"). When lawyers tell their
clients that they must confess, or lose an opportunity for free quality legal representa-
tion as a consequence if they do not, the client's confession runs the risk of being
coerced. Id. at 304 (providing that "an offender who has been ordered to apologize
may simply utter the words without feeling or expressing shame, remorse, or regret").
224. See supra notes 86-89, 113-18 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 86-89, 113-18 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
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sins publicly is a brazen act.227 Similarly, Christianity recognizes
the private nature of the process of seeking repentance.2 8 The
GJP, while certainly well meaning, links the two potentially con-
229flicting processes.
Apparently, the GJP has, through its dedication, hard work and
relative wealth of resources and support services, achieved success-
ful results for its clients in terms of both the outcome of criminal
cases and resolving life problems beyond the narrow criminal pros-
ecution.23 ° I applaud them for their good intentions and their good
work. Nonetheless, I seek to sound a note of caution to any organ-
ization that seeks to use the criminal justice system as a vehicle for
pursuing religious absolution on behalf of its clients. We learn
from the sacred teachings of the Bible and the Talmud that crimi-
nal adjudication and religious repentance are separate processes
that should not be mixed.231' American law emphasizes the individ-
ual and individual rights in relation to government authority. Jew-
ish law, however, focuses on the individual's relationship to G-d
and community. 32 Under a Jewish law system, which bans the use
227. Public proclamation of one's sins was deemed "brazen-faced," as it could lead
to a public sense of lawlessness and casual acceptance of sin. See supra 195-199 and
accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., Robert John Araujo, International Tribunals and Rules of Evidence:
The Case for Respecting and Preserving the "Priest-Penitent" Privilege Under Interna-
tional Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 639, 644-45 (2000) (providing that Pope St. Leo I
"instructed [bishops] on the need for secrecy in confessions in order to safeguard the
reputation of the penitent and to promote greater reconciliation between God and
people"); Anthony Merlino, Tightening the Seal: Protecting the Catholic Confessional
from Unprotective Priest-Penitent Privileges, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 655, 666 (2002)
(providing that repentance strengthens one's relationship with God, and providing
that the Roman Catholic Church's emphasis on private confession is attributable to
the Church's recognition that individuals are less likely to confess, and accordingly
achieve atonement, where confessions are made public); Seymour Moskowitz &
Michael J. DeBoer, When Silence Resounds: Clergy and the Requirement to Report
Elderly Abuse and Neglect, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1999) (discussing the history of,
and emphasis on, private confession in various Christian faiths).
229. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 10-11, 150-162, 228 and accompanying text.
232. See Suzanne Darrow-Kleinhaus, The Talmudic Rule Against Self-Incrimination
and the American Exclusionary Rule: A Societal Prohibition Versus an Affirmative
Individual Right, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 205, 217 (2002)
("Whatever the authority in Jewish law, whether the rabbinical court or the
secular law of the king, the ability to suspend the individual's rights in favor
of the larger society graphically illustrates the major difference between the
American and Jewish legal systems. While American law focuses on the indi-
vidual, both in granting rights and in imposing responsibilities, Jewish law
focuses on the community and the individual's commitment to the
community.").
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of confessions in criminal adjudication, clients of the GJP would
not be faced with potentially contrary goals. Judaism recognizes,
and indeed sets in place, limitations on the adjudicative system ad-
ministered by individuals.233 It subjects the efficiency of such sys-
tems to theological principles, on the premise that G-d's ultimate
judgment is unencumbered by institutionalized rules of proce-
dure.234 The secular system, however, in which criminal defense
attorneys must operate does not recognize any distinction between
a religious individual seeking a victim's forgiveness for the purpose
of obtaining repentance and a criminal defendant providing to the
victim a confession admissible in a court of law.235
Id.
233. See supra notes 10-11, 150-62 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 5-9, 140-41 and accompanying text.
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